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Michael Tonry
The Mostly Unintended
Effects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of
Consistent Findings
ABSTRACT
Policy and knowledge concerning mandatory minimum sentences have
long marched in different directions in the United States. There is no
credible evidence that the enactment or implementation of such sentences
has significant deterrent effects, but there is massive evidence, which has
accumulated for two centuries, that mandatory minimums foster circum-
vention by judges, juries, and prosecutors; reduce accountability and trans-
parency; produce injustices in many cases; and result in wide unwarranted
disparities in the handling of similar cases. No country besides the United
States has adopted many mandatory penalty laws, and none has adopted
laws as severe as those in the United States. If policy makers took account
of research evidence (and informed practitioners' views), existing laws
would be repealed and no new ones would be enacted.
The greatest gap between knowledge and policy in American sen-
tencing concerns mandatory penalties. Experienced practitioners,
policy analysts, and researchers have long agreed that mandatory pen-
alties in all their forms-from 1-year add-ons for gun use in violent
crimes in the 1950s and 1960s, through 10-, 20-, and 30-year federal
minimums for drug offenses in the 1980s, to three-strikes laws in the
1990s-are a bad idea. That is why the U.S. Congress in 1970, at
the urging of Texas Congressman George H. Bush, repealed most of
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the mandatory minimum sentence provisions then contained in fed-
eral law (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991). It is why nearly every
authoritative nonpartisan law reform organization that has considered
the subject, including the American Law Institute in the Model Penal
Code (1962), the American Bar Association in each edition of its Crim-
inal Justice Standards (e.g., 1968, standard 2.3; 1994, standard
18-3.21[b]), the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990), and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission (1991) have opposed enactment, and
favored repeal, of mandatory penalties. In 2007, the American Law
Institute approved a partial second edition of the Model Penal Code
that repudiated mandatory penalties. In 2004, an American Bar As-
sociation commission headed by conservative Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy of the U.S. Supreme Court called upon states, territories, and
the federal government to repeal mandatory minimum sentence stat-
utes (Kennedy 2004). The recommendations were overwhelmingly
approved by the ABA House of Delegates.
Mandatory sentencing laws for felonies take a number of forms. Typ-
ical laws specify minimum prison sentences for designated violent and
drug crimes (e.g., minimum 5 years' imprisonment for selling 10 grams
of crack cocaine). Others require that incremental penalties be imposed
on convicted offenders meeting specified criteria (e.g., anyone con-
victed of an offense involving a firearm must receive 2 years' impris-
onment in addition to that imposed for the offense). Sometimes they
specify minimum sentences to be imposed on people convicted of a
particular offense who have prior felony convictions. Three-strikes
laws, for example, are mandatory sentencing laws. Typically they pro-
vide that anyone convicted of a designated (usually violent or drug)
crime, who has previously twice been convicted of similar crimes, be
sentenced to a prison sentence of 25 years or more.
Several other kinds of "mandatory" sentencing laws are not addressed
in this essay. I do not discuss mandatory sentences for misdemeanors; a
common example is laws that mandate short jail terms for some drunk-
driving offenses. I do not discuss laws that use the word "mandatory"
but do not mean it. "Mandatory life" sentences for murder are legally
required in England and in some Australian states. The terminology,
however, is misleading. In most cases, the judge also indicates how long
the offender should be held before release on parole. Utterance of the
words "mandatory life imprisonment" is obligatory; a life spent behind
bars is not. Finally, I do not discuss mandatory confinement under civil
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law authority. This primarily affects people being held for immigration
law violations pending hearings or deportation.
Policy makers promoting mandatory penalties usually offer three jus-
tifications. Mandatory penalties are said to assure evenhandedness: every
offender who does the crime will do the time. They are said to be trans-
parent: mandatory penalty laws assure everyone, offenders, practitioners,
and the general public alike, that justice will be done and be seen to be
done. They are said to prevent crime: the certainty of punishment will
deter would-be offenders. The insuperable difficulty with all these claims
is that centuries of evidence show them to be untrue.'
There is a fourth justification, but it is one that has no place in a
society that takes human rights seriously. Enactment of mandatory
penalties is sometimes justified in expressive terms, irrespective of
their effects. Their enactment is said to acknowledge public anxiety
and assuage victims' anger.2 They are a sign that policy makers are
listening, and care, and are prepared to take action. This assumes,
however, that offenders' interests in being treated justly and fairly do
not warrant consideration. People may sometimes feel that way, but
that cannot be a legitimate basis for making policy in a free society.
In no other setting would the claim be allowed that harm may prop-
erly be done to individuals solely because doing so might give plea-
sure to other people.
Objections to mandatory penalties are well documented and of long
standing. They are not mandatory, whatever the law may say, and they
are not transparent. When mandatory penalty laws require imposition
of sentences that practitioners believe are too severe, three things hap-
pen. Sometimes prosecutors sidestep the laws by not bringing charges
subject to them or by agreeing to dismiss them in plea negotiations.
Sometimes sentences are imposed that everyone involved believes are
unjustly severe. Sometimes judges and prosecutors disingenuously
evade their application. Because these things happen, mandatory pen-
'Another possible argument for mandatory penalties is that they encourage defendants
to plead guilty (Boerner 1995). This is a non sequitur. Were there no mandatories,
defendants now affected by them would remain subject to all the pressures that face every
criminal defendant. They would simply no longer face out-of-the-ordinary-and there-
fore unfair-pressures resulting from the rigidity and excessive severity of many man-
datory minimum sentence laws. In any case, as studies discussed in Secs. I-MI demonstrate,
prosecutors are often complicit in circumvention of mandatory penalties.
2 A substantial public opinion literature shows that support for mandatory minimums
is typically high when people are asked about them in the abstract but falls to low levels
when people are asked about particular cases (Roberts 2003).
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alties produce wide disparities between cases that are comparable in
every way except how they were handled. And because practitioners
often feel they must devise ways to circumvent their application, critical
decisions are not made in court openly, transparently, and accountably.
Laws ostensibly meant to produce consistent penalties on center stage
produce inconsistent ones behind the scenes.
Nor does the evidence show that mandatory penalties provide effec-
tive deterrents to crime. From the accounts of pockets being picked at
the hangings of pickpockets in eighteenth-century England (Teeters
and Hedblom 1967; Hay et al. 1975) to the systematic empirical eval-
uations of the past 30 years, similar conclusions emerge. Mandatory
penalty laws have not been credibly shown to have measurable deter-
rent effects for any save minor crimes such as speeding or illegal park-
ing or for short-term effects that quickly waste away.3
Two separate claims are sometimes conflated. One is that mandatory
penalty laws prevent crimes by means of their putative certainty of ap-
plication. Relatively little research has been done on that question. When
probabilities of suspicion, arrest, prosecution, and conviction are com-
pounded and the time required to dispose of cases is taken into account,
certainty is an unrealistic aim in any case. The second claim, sometimes
referred to as the marginal deterrence hypothesis, is that increases to
previously applicable penalties will prevent crimes by raising their pro-
spective punitive cost. A few studies by economists have found marginal
deterrent effects (e.g., Shepherd 2002; Levitt and Miles 2007), 4 but they
have been refuted by other economists.5 Most other social scientists con-
clude that the hypothesis cannot be confirmed (e.g., Doob and Webster
' Laurence Ross (1982) showed that apparent effects even of drunk-driving crackdowns
soon waste away. Lawrence Sherman (1990) demonstrated the wasting effect of police
crackdowns and proposed that police harness that effect by repeatedly shifting their
geographical focus after brief periods of "residual deterrence" can be expected to end.
4 Economists generally assume that increased penalties will reduce crime rates and attempt
in their research to determine by how much. Ronald Coase, the Nobel Prize-winning pioneer
of the law-and-economics movement, observed: "Punishment, for example, can be regarded
as the price of crime. An economist will not debate whether increased punishment will reduce crime;
he will merely try to answer the question, by how much?" (1978, p. 210; emphasis added).
Other social scientists attempt to determine whether punishment increases affect behavior.
This disciplinary difference may be why economists generally conclude that increased
punishments deter and other social scientists generally conclude that the hypothesis can-
not be confirmed.
'John Donohue (2006, p. 4), observing that "[Nobel Prize winner Gary] Becker sug-
gests that price theory can fill in where empirical evidence is lacking: capital punishment
is akin to a rise in the price of murder and hence might be expected to lessen the number
of murders," rhetorically asks whether many economists' vigorous defense of traditional
economic models in relation to crime is in effect a defense of price theory itself.
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2003; Webster, Doob, and Zimring 2006; Tonry 2008) or that occasional
findings of deterrent effects in studies of particular policies in particular
places have no generalizable policy implications (e.g., Cook 1980; Nagin
1998; Pratt et al. 2006, p. 379). The clear weight of the evidence is that
the marginal deterrence hypothesis cannot be confirmed. In any case,
the hypothesis has only limited relevance to understanding the effects of
mandatory penalties and provides no basis for making policy decisions.
Even in theory, it is germane only to the period immediately after en-
actment of a new or harsher law.
No one who has lived in the United States, however, can be unaware
that conservative politicians for 3 decades consistently promoted pas-
sage of more and harsher mandatory sentence laws. Moderate and lib-
eral politicians, most famously former President Bill Clinton, from the
mid-1980s onward more often than not followed suit. Between the
mid-1970s and the mid-1980s, every American state but one enacted
at least one new mandatory penalty law (Shane-DuBow, Brown, and
Olsen 1985). Most adopted many such laws for violent, sexual, and
drug offenses and for "career criminals." The U.S. Congress repeat-
edly, between 1984 and 1996, enacted new mandatory sentencing laws
and increased penalties under existing ones (Austin et al. 1994). The
first "three strikes and you're out" law was enacted by referendum in
Washington State in 1993 and was followed most famously in Califor-
nia in 1994 but also by more than 23 other states and the federal
government (Dickey and Hollenhorst 1999; Chen 2008, table 1).
The pace of new enactments has slowed. Except in Alaska in 2006,
no new three-strikes laws were enacted in American states after 1996
(Chen 2008, table 1). In some states, the scope of mandatory penalty
laws has been narrowed, though only slightly, and in a few states judges
were given new discretion to impose some other sentence in narrowly
defined categories of cases (Butterfield 2003; Steinhauer 2009). As
these words were written in March 2009, New York's governor and
legislature were reported to have agreed on repeal of most of the Rock-
efeller Drug Laws (Peters 2009). In 2007, the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission changed its guidelines to narrow the ramifications of manda-
tory penalties for drug crimes.6 Taken as a whole, and with the
6 It is a long story. The initial commissioners in the 1980s set sentences for many
offenses not subject to mandatory penalties longer than they needed to be on the logic
that if the mandatory penalty statutes had applied, those offenses would have been covered
as the commission prescribed.
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exception of repeal of the New York laws, if that happens, as Adam
Liptak (2007, p. A21) noted of the U.S. Sentencing Commission
changes, these changes only nibble at the edges: "The sentencing com-
mission's striking move . . . will have only a minor impact. Unless
Congress acts, many thousands of defendants will continue to face
vastly different sentences for selling different types of the same thing."
No major laws have been repealed, no major laws have been enacted
retroactively to shorten the sentences of the hundreds of thousands of
prisoners serving time under mandatory minimum laws, and most new
laws narrowing their scope have been restrictively drafted to cover only
minor offenses and offenders.
The decent thing to do would be to repeal all existing mandatory
penalties and to enact no new ones. If that is politically impracticable,
there are ways to avoid or ameliorate the foreseeable dysfunctional ef-
fects of mandatory penalties. First, make penalties presumptive rather
than mandatory. Second, add "sunset provisions" providing that the laws
lapse and become presumptive after 3-5 years, and include such provi-
sions in any new mandatory minimum sentencing laws. Third, limit
lengthy prison terms-whether or not subject to mandatory penalties-
to serious crimes such as grievous assaults causing serious injury, aggra-
vated rape, murder, and flagrant financial crimes. Fourth, authorize cor-
rectional officials to reconsider release dates of all offenders receiving
prison sentences exceeding a designated length (say 5 or 10 years).
This essay summarizes research on the implementation, operation,
and deterrent effects of mandatory sentencing laws. Sections 1, 11, and
III are chronological and survey knowledge concerning the implemen-
tation of mandatory penalties since the eighteenth century.7 I discuss
the handful of most ambitious studies in some detail-some might
think belaboredly-to show that centuries-old knowledge continues
well founded in our world. Section I examines research before 1970.
Section II examines the major empirical evaluations of mandatory pen-
alties in the 1970s and 1980s, including the 1978 evaluation of New
York's "Rockefeller Drug Laws." Section IlM discusses the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission's 1991 study of federal mandatory minimum sen-
tence laws and the small body of research that has accumulated since
then. Section IV summarizes the small literature on mandatory mini-
mums in other countries, primarily Australia, England and Wales, and
' Sections I and II draw heavily on an earlier essay that summarized research on man-
datory penalties through the early 1990s (Tonry 1996, chap. 5).
The Effects of Mandatory Penalties
South Africa. Although the mandatory penalties are much less harsh
in those countries and the research is less extensive, the findings are
indistinguishable from those in the United States. Section V examines
research on deterrent effects. Section VI tries to make sense of these
findings and to outline their policy implications.
I. Mandatory Penalties before 1970
The foreseeable problems in implementing mandatory penalties have
been well known for 200 years. A U.S. House of Representatives report,
explaining why the Congress in 1970 repealed almost all federal man-
datory penalties for drug offenses, accurately summarized what was then
known: "The severity of existing penalties, involving in many instances
minimum mandatory sentences, has led in many instances to reluctance
on the part of prosecutors to prosecute some violations, where the pen-
alties seem to be out of line with the seriousness of the offenses. In
addition, severe penalties, which do not take into account individual cir-
cumstances, and which treat casual violators as severely as they treat
hardened criminals, tend to make conviction . . . more difficult to ob-
tain" (quoted in U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991, pp. 6-7).
The least subtle way to avoid imposition of harsh penalties is to
nullify them. "Nullification," a term in common usage for more than
two centuries, encapsulates the process by which judges and juries
refuse to enforce laws or apply penalties that they consider unjust.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. described the jury's capacity to nullify
harsh laws as among its principal virtues (Holmes 1889). Harvard
Law School Dean Roscoe Pound claimed that "jury lawlessness is the
great corrective of law in its actual administration" (1910, p. 18).John
Baldwin and Michael McConville, in a review of jury research, ob-
served: "The refusal of juries to convict in cases of criminal libel, the
'pious perjury' they welcomed in order to avoid conviction on a cap-
ital offense, the indulgence shown toward 'mercy killings' and the
nullification of the Prohibition laws during the 1920s are simply the
most famous examples of this exercise of discretion" (1980, p. 272).
The leading criminal law casebook in use in American law schools
for 30 years, Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler's Criminal Law
and Its Administration (1940), gave lengthy and respectful consider-
ation to nullification.
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A. The Death Penalty in Eighteenth-Century England
The death penalty debate in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century En-
gland is strikingly similar to contemporary American debates about
mandatory penalties. In July 1991, in the face of claims that newly
proposed mandatory penalty laws would overburden the courts and
have little practical effect, one congressman told the New York Times:
"Congressmen and Senators are afraid to vote no" on crime and pun-
ishment bills, "even if they don't think it will accomplish anything." A
Senate aide suggested that "it's tough to vote against tough sentences
for criminals" (Ifill 1991, p. A6). At the end of the eighteenth century,
Edmund Burke declared "that he could obtain the consent of the
House of Commons to any Bill imposing the punishment of death"
(Select Committee on Capital Punishment 1930, paras. 10, 11). Samuel
Romilly, England's most celebrated nineteenth-century death penalty
opponent, repeatedly called for repeal of capital punishment laws be-
cause they were applied erratically and unfairly and because the erratic
application inevitably undermined whatever deterrent effects they
might possibly have had (Romilly 1820).
During the reigns of the four Kings George, between 1714 and
1830, the British Parliament created 156 new capital offenses. By 1819,
British law recognized 220 capital offenses, most of them property
crimes. During the same period, however, the number of executions
steadily declined. Douglas Hay (1975), in a famous essay "Property,
Authority, and the Criminal Law," explained the anomaly. The prop-
ertied classes in the early years of the Industrial Revolution, he argued,
attempted to protect their financial interests through promotion and
passage of laws that emphasized the importance of private property (by
making numerous property crimes punishable by death). At the same
time, the same people, often serving as magistrates and judges, oper-
ated a legal system that provided exemplary punishments and, by mak-
ing frequent merciful exceptions and observing procedural rules that
made death sentences difficult to obtain, protected the system's legit-
imacy in the eyes of the general public.
Judges and juries went to extreme lengths to avoid imposing death
sentences. Juries often refused to convict. A variant, with twentieth-
century echoes, was to convict of a lesser offense. According to a
1930 report of the British Select Committee on Capital Punishment,
describing eighteenth-century practices,
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In vast numbers of cases, the sentence of death was not passed, or
if passed was not carried into effect. For one thing, juries in in-
creasing numbers refused to convict. A jury would assess the
amount taken from a shop at 4s. [shillings] 10d. [pence] so as to
avoid the capital penalty which fell on a theft of 5s. In the case of
a dwelling, where the theft of 40s. was a capital offense, even
when a woman confessed that she had stolen £5, the jury notwith-
standing found that the amount was only 39s. And when later, in
1827, the legislature raised the capital indictment to £5, the juries
at the same time raised their verdicts to £4 19s. (Select Committee
on Capital Punishment 1930, para. 17)
As more capital offenses were created, the courts adopted increas-
ingly narrow interpretations of procedural, pleading, and evidentiary
rules. Seemingly well-founded prosecutions would fall because a name
or a date was incorrect or a defendant was wrongly described as a
"farmer" rather than as a "yeoman" (Radzinowicz 1948-68, vol. 1, pp.
25-28, 89-91, 97-103; Hay 1980, pp. 32-34).
Even among those sentenced to death, the proportion executed declined
steadily. According to the Select Committee on Capital Punishment, "The
Prerogative of the crown [pardon] was increasingly exercised. Down to
1756 about two-thirds of those condemned were actually brought to the
scaffold; from 1756 to 1772 the proportion sank to one-half. Between 1802
and 1808 it was no more than one-eighth" (1930, para. 21). Most of those
pardoned received substituted punishments of a term of imprisonment or
transportation (Stephen 1883, vol. 1, chap. 13).
B. Mandatory Penalties in the 1950s
The American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in the United States in the 1950s confirmed the les-
sons from eighteenth-century England. Frank Remington, director of
the 18-year project, noted: "Legislative prescription of a high manda-
tory sentence for certain offenders is likely to result in a reduction in
charges at the prosecution stage, or if this is not done, by a refusal of
the judge to convict at the adjudication stage. The issue . . . thus is
not solely whether certain offenders should be dealt with severely, but
also how the criminal justice system will accommodate to the legislative
charge" (1969, p. xvii).
The survey's findings are exemplified by three processes the reports
described. First, Donald Newman described how Michigan judges dealt
with a lengthy mandatory minimum for drug sales:
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Mandatory minimums are almost universally disliked by trial
judges. . . The clearest illustration of routine reductions is pro-
vided by reduction of sale of narcotics to possession or addiction.
. . Judges . . . actively participated in the charge reduction pro-
cess to the extent of refusing to accept guilty pleas to sale and lib-
erally assigning counsel to work out reduced charges. . . . To
demonstrate its infrequent application, from the effective date of
the revised law (May 8, 1952) to the date of tabulation four years
later (June 30, 1956), only twelve sale-of-narcotics convictions
were recorded in Detroit out of 476 defendants originally charged
with sale. The remainder (except a handful acquitted altogether)
pleaded guilty to reduced charges. (Newman 1966, p. 179)
Second, Newman described efforts to avoid 15-year mandatory max-
imum sentences for breaking-and-entering and armed robbery:
In Michigan conviction of armed robbery or breaking and entering
in the nighttime (fifteen-year maximum compared to five years for
daytime breaking) is rare. The pattern of downgrading is such that
it becomes virtually routine, and the bargaining session becomes a
ritual. The real issue in such negotiations is not whether the
charge will be reduced but how far, that is, to what lesser offense.
. . . [A]rmed robbery is so often downgraded that the Michigan
parole board tends to treat a conviction for unarmed robbery as
prima facie proof that the defendant had a weapon. And the fre-
quency of altering nighttime burglary to breaking and entering in
the daytime led one prosecutor to remark: "You'd think all our
burglaries occur at high noon." (1966, p. 182)
Third, Robert 0. Dawson described "very strong" judicial resistance
to a 20-year mandatory minimum for sale of narcotics: "All of the
judges of Recorder's Court, in registering their dislike for the provi-
sion, cited the hypothetical case of a young man having no criminal
record being given a twenty-year minimum sentence for selling a single
marijuana cigarette. Charge reductions to possession or use are routine.
Indeed, in some cases, judges have refused to accept guilty pleas to sale
of narcotics, but have continued the case and appointed counsel with
instructions to negotiate a charge reduction" (1969, p. 201).
These findings from the American Bar Foundation Survey differ in
detail from those of eighteenth-century England, but only in detail.
When the U.S. Congress repealed most mandatory penalties for drug
offenses in 1970, it was merely acknowledging enforcement problems
that had long been recognized.
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II. Mandatory Penalties in the 1970s and 1980s
Between 1975 and 1996, mandatory minimums were America's most
frequently enacted sentencing law changes. By 1983, 49 of the 50 states
(Wisconsin was the holdout) had adopted mandatory sentencing laws
for offenses other than murder or drunk driving (Shane-DuBow,
Brown, and Olsen 1985, table 30). By 1994, every state had adopted
mandatory penalties; most had several (Austin et al. 1994). Most man-
datory penalties apply to drug offenses, murder or aggravated rape,
felonies involving firearms, or felonies committed by people who have
previous felony convictions. Between 1985 and mid-1991, the U.S.
Congress enacted at least 20 new mandatory penalty provisions; by
1991, more than 60 federal statutes subjected more than 100 crimes to
mandatory penalties (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991, pp. 8-10).
More followed, including the federal three-strikes law, in the next few
years. Few if any new mandatory penalty laws were enacted after 1996.8
The experience in most states in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
similar. In Florida, for example, seven new mandatory sentencing laws
were enacted between 1988 and 1990 (Austin 1991, p. 4). In Arizona,
mandatory sentencing laws were so common that 57 percent of felony
offenders in fiscal year 1990 were potentially subject to mandatory sen-
tencing provisions, although in the vast majority of cases defendants
were allowed to plead guilty to offenses not subject to minimums
(Knapp 1991, p. 10).
The empirical evidence for this period comes primarily from four
major studies. One is an evaluation of the "Rockefeller Drug Laws"
(Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation 1978). One con-
cerns the Michigan law requiring imposition of a 2-year mandatory
prison sentence on persons convicted of possession of a gun during com-
mission of a felony (Loftin and McDowall 1981; Loftin, Heumann, and
McDowall 1983). Two concern a Massachusetts law requiring a 1-year
prison sentence for persons convicted of carrying a firearm unlawfully
(Beha 1977; Rossman et al. 1979). These studies differ from those in the
1950s in that they examined court processes but also used quantitative
data to look for effects on overall system operations, especially guilty
plea and trial rates, and overall sentencing patterns.
'I have not checked the statutes of every U.S. jurisdiction. The National Conference
of State Legislatures publishes annual reports entitled "State Crime Legislation in [e.g.]
2006"; these describe minor changes in state mandatory penalty laws since the mid-1990s
but no major new ones (http://www.ncsl.org).
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TABLE 1
Drug Felony Processing in New York State
1976
1972 1973* 1974 1975 (January-June)
Arrests 19,269 15,594 17,670 15,941 8,166
Indictments:
N 7,528 5,969 5,791 4,283 2,073
Percent of arrests 39.1 38.3 32.8 26.9 25.4
Indictments disposed 6,911 5,580 3,939 3,989 2,173
Convictions:
N 6,033 4,739 3,085 3,147 1,724
Percent of dispositions 87.3 84.9 78.3 78.9 79.3
Prison and jail sentences:
N 2,039 1,555 1,074 1,369 945
Percent of convictions 33.8 32.8 34.8 43.5 54.8
Percent of arrests 10.6 10.0 6.1 8.6 11.6
SOURCE.-Joint Committee (1978), tables 19, 24, 27, 29.
* The drug law went into effect on September 1, 1973.
A. The Rockefeller Drug Laws in New York
The most exhaustive evaluation concerned the "Rockefeller Drug
Laws" (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation 1978).
They took effect on September 1, 1973. They mandated lengthy prison
sentences for narcotics offenses and included statutory limits on plea
bargaining. The key findings were these: drug felony arrests, indict-
ment rates, and conviction rates all declined; for those who were con-
victed, however, the likelihood of being imprisoned and the average
length of prison term increased; the two preceding patterns canceled
each other out, and the likelihood that a person arrested for a drug
felony was imprisoned was about the same after the law took effect as
before-around 11 percent; the proportion of drug felony dispositions
resulting from trials tripled between 1973 and 1976, and the average
time for processing of a single case doubled.
Table 1 shows case processing patterns for drug felony cases in New
York during the period 1972-76. The percentage of drug felony arrests
resulting in indictments declined steadily from 39.1 percent in 1972,
before the law took effect, to 25.4 percent in the first half of 1976.
Similarly, the likelihood of conviction, given indictment, declined from
87.3 percent in 1972 to 79.3 percent in the first half of 1976.
Practitioners made vigorous efforts to avoid application of the man-
datory sentences in cases in which they viewed those sentences as being
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too harsh; the remaining cases were dealt with as the law dictated
(Blumstein et al. 1983, pp. 188-89). Thus, the percentage of drug fel-
onies in New York City disposed of by means of a trial rather than a
guilty plea rose from 6 percent in 1972 to 17 percent in the first 6
months of 1976. Many fewer defendants pled guilty, and the trial rate
tripled. It took between 10 and 15 times as much court time to dispose
of a case by trial as by plea, and the average case processing time for
disposed cases increased from 172 days in the last 4 months of 1973
to 351 days in the first 6 months of 1976. Backlogs rose commensu-
rately (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation 1978).'
Sentencing severity increased substantially for defendants who were
convicted. Only 3 percent of sentenced drug felons between 1972 and
1974 under prior law received minimum sentences longer than 3 years.
Under the new law, 22 percent did. The likelihood that a person con-
victed of a drug felony in New York State received a prison sentence
grew from 33.8 percent in 1972 to 54.8 percent in the first 6 months
of 1976 (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation 1978,
pp. 99-103).
B. Massachusetts's Bartley-Fox Amendment
Massachusetts's Bartley-Fox Amendment required imposition of a
1-year mandatory minimum prison sentence, without suspension, fur-
lough, or parole, for anyone convicted of unlawful carrying of an un-
licensed firearm. An offender need not have committed any other
crime.
Two major evaluations were conducted (Beha 1977; Rossman et al.
1979). Some background on the Boston courts may make the following
discussion of their findings more intelligible. The Boston Municipal
Court is both a trial court and a preliminary hearing court. If a defen-
dant is dissatisfied with his or her conviction or sentence, an appeal
may be made to the Suffolk County Superior Court for a new trial.
James Beha's (1977) analysis was based primarily on comparisons of
police and court records for the 6-month periods before and after the
law's effective date. David Rossman and his colleagues (1979) dealt
with official records from 1974, 1975, and 1976 supplemented by in-
terviews with police, lawyers, and court personnel.
9 However, anticipating a finding from later studies, later analyses by Feeley and Kamin
(1996) showed that, within a few years, a new "going-rate" equilibrium was established
and trial rates and case processing times returned to former levels.
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The primary findings were these:
1. Police altered their behavior in ways aimed at limiting the law's
reach. They became more selective about whom to frisk; the ab-
solute number of reports of gun incidents taking place out of
doors decreased, which meant a concomitant decrease in arrests,
and the number of weapons seized without arrest increased by
120 percent from 1974 to 1976 (Carlson [1982, p. 6], relying on
Rossman et al. [1979]).
2. The number of persons "absconding" increased substantially be-
tween the period before the law took effect and the period after
(both studies).
3. Outcomes favorable to defendants, including both dismissals and
acquittals, increased significantly between the before and after pe-
riods (both studies).
4. Of persons convicted of firearms carrying charges in Boston Mu-
nicipal Court, appeal rates increased radically (Beha 1977, table
2). In 1974, 21 percent of municipal court convictions were ap-
pealed to the Superior Court. The appeal rate in 1976 was 94
percent (Rossman et al. 1979).
5. The percentage of defendants who entirely avoided a conviction
rose from 53.5 percent in 1974 to 80 percent in 1976 (Carlson
[1982, p. 10], relying on Rossman et al. [1979]).
6. Of that residuum of offenders who were finally convicted, the
probability of receiving an incarcerative sentence increased from
23 percent to 100 percent (Carlson [1982, p. 8], relying on Ross-
man et al. [1979]).
C. The Michigan Felony Firearms Statute
The Michigan Felony Firearms Statute created a new offense of
possessing a firearm while engaging in a felony and specified a 2-year
mandatory prison sentence that could not be suspended or shortened
by release on parole and that had to be served consecutively to a sen-
tence imposed for the underlying felony. The law took effect on Jan-
uary 1, 1977. The Wayne County prosecutor banned charge bargaining
in firearms cases and took measures to enforce the ban, suggesting that
the likelihood of circumvention should have been less than was expe-
rienced in New York and Massachusetts.
Heumann and Loftin (1979) observed a strong tendency in Wayne
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County toward early dismissal of charges other than on the merits.
They interpreted this as evidence of efforts to avoid applying the man-
datory penalties. They focused on three offenses: armed robbery,
"other assaults," and felonious assault. "Felonious assaults" tend to
arise from "disputes among acquaintances or relatives and are less
predatory than armed robbery." "Other assaults" is an intermediate
category.
Case processing patterns for felonious assault, the low-severity of-
fense, did not change after the mandatory penalty provision took effect.
There was some increase in early dismissal of armed robbery charges
and a substantial increase in dismissals of "other assaults." These find-
ings are consistent with the hypothesis that efforts were made to avoid
application of the mandatory penalty to defendants for whom lawyers
and judges believed it inappropriately severe.
The probabilities of conviction differed after implementation de-
pending on the offense. Consistent with the Massachusetts findings
that mandatory sentences reduce the probability of convictions, con-
viction probabilities declined for "other assaults" and armed robbery
(Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall 1983, p. 295).
The effects of the Felony Firearm Statute on sentencing severity
were assessed in two ways. Using quantitative methods, Loftin, Heu-
mann, and McDowall (1983) concluded that the statute did not gen-
erally increase the probability that prison sentences would be imposed,
but for those receiving prison sentences, it increased the expected
lengths of sentences for some offenses (pp. 297-98). Using simpler
tabular analyses, they concluded that, overall, the percentage of defen-
dants vulnerable to the firearms law who were incarcerated did not
change markedly (Heumann and Loftin 1979).
As table 2 indicates, the probability of a prison sentence, given filing
of the charge, increased slightly for felonious assault and other assault
and decreased slightly for armed robbery. The probability of incarcer-
ation given conviction also did not change markedly for felonious as-
sault or armed robbery. It did change for other assault, increasing from
57 percent of convictions prior to implementation of the firearm law
to 82 percent afterward. This resulted in part from the substantial shift
toward early dismissal of other assault charges, reducing the residuum
of cases to be sentenced from 65 percent of cases to 50 percent.
Finally, trial rates remained roughly comparable before and after
implementation, except for the least serious category of offenses, fe-
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TABLE 2
Disposition of Original Charges in Wayne County, Michigan, by
Offense Type and Time Period
Dismissed Dismissed
at/before or Acquitted Convicted/ Some
Pretrial after Pretrial No Prison Prison Total
N (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Felonious assault:
Before* 145 24 31 31 14 100
After' 39 26 26 31 18 101
Other assault:
Before 240 12 24 28 37 101
After 53 26 24 9 41 100
Armed robbery:
Before 471 13 19 4 64 100
After 136 22 17 2 60 101
SOURCE.-Cohen and Tonry (1983), tables 7-10; adapted from Heumann and Loftin
(1979), table 3.
NOTE.-The totals do not always sum to 100 percent because of rounding.
* Offense committed before January 1, 1977, and case disposed between July 1, 1976,
and June 30, 1977.
t Offense committed and case disposed between January 1, 1977, and June 30, 1977.
lonious assaults, for which the percentage of cases resolved at trial
increased from 16 percent of cases to 41 percent (Heumann and Loftin
1979, table 4). This is explained by Heumann and Loftin in terms of
an innovative adaptive response, the "waiver trial." By agreement or
by expectation, the judge would convict the defendant of a misde-
meanor rather than the charged felony (the firearms law applied only
to felonies) or would simply, with the prosecutor's acquiescence, acquit
the defendant on the firearms charge. Either approach eliminated the
threat of a mandatory sentence. A third mechanism for nullifying the
mandatory sentencing law was to decrease the sentence that otherwise
would have been imposed by 2 years and then add the 2 years back on
the basis of the firearms law (Heumann and Loftin 1979, pp. 416-24).
D. The New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan Studies
The Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York laws are especially
good illustrations of the operation of mandatory sentencing laws. For
differing reasons, vigorous and highly publicized efforts were made to
make them effective. The New York law was the first piece of high-
visibility law-and-order legislation enacted in the 1970s in the United
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States; it attracted enormous attention both because it happened in
New York and because its proponent, Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
long known as a liberal Republican, used it in part to attempt to es-
tablish more conservative credentials. ° Amid enormous publicity and
massive media attention, the legislature authorized and funded 31 new
courts, including creation of additional judges, construction of new
courtrooms, and provision of support personnel and resources, and
expressly forbade some kinds of plea bargaining to assure the manda-
tory sentences were imposed. In Massachusetts, while the statute did
not address plea bargaining, it expressly forbade "diversion in the form
of continuance without a finding or filing of cases," both devices used
in the Boston Municipal Court for disposition of cases other than on
the merits." In Michigan, the Wayne County prosecutor established
and enforced a ban on plea bargaining. He also launched a major pub-
licity campaign, promising on billboards and bumper stickers that
"One with a Gun Gets You Two."
Nothing in these findings would surprise the authors of the Amer-
ican Bar Foundation Surveys or observers of eighteenth-century En-
glish courts.
Ill. Mandatory Minimums since 1990
The evaluators of the Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Michigan Felony
Firearms law investigated deterrent effects of mandatory penalties, but
most research before 1990 paid primary attention to sentencing pat-
terns and case processing. Since 1990, only two major published studies
looked primarily at those subjects. Most studies, discussed in Section
V, investigated deterrent (and sometimes incapacitative) effects.
A. U.S. Sentencing Commission Report
The U.S. Sentencing Commission report, Mandatory Minimum Pen-
alties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, demonstrates that manda-
tory minimum sentencing laws shift discretion from judges to prose-
cutors, result in higher trial rates and lengthened case processing times,
fail to acknowledge salient differences between cases, and often punish
10 It seems to have worked. President Gerald Ford, himself initially an unelected suc-
cessor to Vice President Spiro Agnew, later appointed Rockefeller as his vice president.
" Filing is a practice in which cases are left open with no expectation that they will
ever be closed; continuance without finding leaves the case open in anticipation of eventual
dismissal if the defendant avoids further trouble.
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minor offenders more harshly than anyone involved believes is war-
ranted. Heavy majorities of judges, defense counsel, and probation of-
ficers disliked mandatory penalties; prosecutors were about evenly di-
vided. Judges and lawyers often circumvented mandatory sentence
laws. 
12
The commission analyzed three data sets describing federal sen-
tencing and two sources of data concerning the opinions of judges,
assistant U.S. attorneys, and others. The three data sets were FPSSIS,
U.S. Sentencing Commission monitoring data for fiscal year 1990, and
a 12.5 percent random sample of defendants sentenced in fiscal year
1990. Data for the random sample were augmented by examining com-
puterized and paper case files to identify cases (there were 1,165 de-
fendants) that met statutory criteria for receipt of a mandatory mini-
mum drug or weapon sentence.
The sources of data on practitioners' views were structured inter-
views of 234 practitioners in 12 sites (48 judges, 72 assistant U.S. at-
torneys, 48 defense attorneys, and 66 probation officers) and a May
1991 mail survey of 2,998 practitioners (the same groups as were in-
terviewed; 1,261 had responded by the time the report was written).
1. Sentencing Analyses. The sentencing data revealed a number of
not unexpected patterns. First, prosecutors often did not file charges
that carried mandatory minimums when the evidence would have sup-
ported such charges. Prosecutors failed to file charges for mandatory
weapons enhancements against 45 percent of drug defendants for
whom they would have been appropriate. Prosecutors failed to seek
mandatory sentencing enhancements for prior felony convictions in 63
percent of cases in which they could have done so. Only in 74 percent
of cases were defendants charged with the offense carrying the highest
applicable mandatory minimum.
Second, prosecutors used mandatory provisions tactically to induce
guilty pleas. Among defendants fully charged with applicable manda-
tory sentence charges and convicted at trial, 96 percent received the
full mandatory minimum sentence. Of those pleading guilty, by con-
trast, 27 percent pled to charges bearing no mandatory minimum or a
lower one. Of all defendants who pled guilty (whether or not initially
charged with applicable mandatory-bearing charges), 32 percent had
no mandatory minimum at conviction; 53 percent were sentenced be-
12 The U.S. General Accounting Office (1993) reached similar conclusions.
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low the minimum the evidence would have justified. Among defendants
against whom mandatory weapons enhancements were filed, the weap-
ons charges were later dismissed in 26 percent of cases.
Third, mandatory penalties increased trial rates and thereby in-
creased work loads and case processing times. Nearly 30 percent of
those convicted of offenses bearing mandatory minimums were con-
victed at trial, a rate two-and-one-half times the overall trial rate for
federal criminal defendants.
Fourth, judges were often willing to work around, and under, the
mandatory penalties. Forty percent of defendants whose cases the com-
mission believed warranted mandatory minimums received shorter sen-
tences than applicable statutes specified. Mandatory minimum defen-
dants received downward departures 22 percent of the time. The
commission observed that "the increased departure rate may reflect a
greater tendency to exercise prosecutorial or judicial discretion as the
severity of the penalties increases" (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991,
p. 53). To like effect, "the prosecutors' reasons for reducing or dis-
missing mandatory charges. . . may be attributable to. . . satisfaction
with the punishment received [after the reduction or dismissal]" (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1991, p. 58)."
Other studies confirmed the commission's principal findings.14 A se-
ries of analyses of plea bargaining under the federal guidelines con-
ducted by Stephen Schulhofer showed that prosecutors and defense
counsel, in nearly a third of cases examined, manipulated the guide-
lines, often with tacit judicial approval, to achieve sentence reductions
(Schulhofer and Nagel 1989; Nagel and Schulhofer 1992). This finding
is not on its face surprising; plea negotiation is common everywhere
in the United States, and sentence reductions are what defendants want
(Schulhofer 1997).
Schulhofer's conclusion that sentences in a third of cases were re-
duced by prosecutorial manipulation was probably an underestimate.
The manipulations were in violation of commission (and often De-
" Judicialand prosecutorial avoidance of mandatory penalties is probably much greater
in 2009 than it was at the time of the commission's 1991 study; analyses by Bowman
and Heise (2001, 2002) showed that overall circumvention of guidelines increased steadily
during the 1990s and average sentence lengths decreased.
" In the text I mention studies only of federal mandatory minimums. There is a large
general literature on how and why prosecutors, often in consort with judges and defense
lawyers, circumvent sentencing laws and guidelines. There are studies on three-strikes
in California (e.g., Harris andJesilow 2000) and federal (e.g., Johnson, Ulmer, and Kramer
2008) and state (e.g., Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer 2008) guidelines.
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partment of Justice) policies and sometimes involved judicial acquies-
cence.'" Neither assistant U.S. attorneys nor judges have an interest in
publicly acknowledging their willful evasion of sentencing guidelines
and mandatory penalties. A Federal Judicial Center survey of all federal
district court judges and probation officers in 1996 showed that 73.2
percent of judges and 93.2 percent of probation officers "strongly" or
"somewhat agree" that "plea bargains are a source of hidden unwar-
ranted disparity in the guidelines system" (Johnson and Gilbert 1997,
table 7).16
2. Opinion Surveys. No category of federal court practitioners, in-
cluding prosecutors, much liked mandatory minimum sentencing laws
(U.S. Sentencing Commission 1991, chap. 6). In 1-hour structured
interviews, 38 of 48 federal district court judges offered unfavorable
comments. Among 48 defense counsel, only one had anything positive
to say, and he also had negative comments. Probation officers were
also overwhelmingly hostile. The most common complaints for all
three groups were that the mandatory penalties were too harsh, re-
sulted in too many trials, and eliminated judicial discretion. Only
among prosecutors was sentiment more favorable; even among them,
however, 34 of 61 were wholly (23) or partly (11) negative.
The mail survey showed that 62 percent of judges, 52 percent of
private counsel, and 89 percent of federal defenders wanted mandatory
penalties for drug crimes eliminated. A 1993 Gallup Poll survey of
judges who were members of the American Bar Association found that
82 percent of state judges and 94 percent of federal judges disapproved
of mandatory minimums (ABA Journal 1994). A 1994 Federal Judicial
Center survey reported that 72 percent of circuit court judges and 86
percent of district court judges moderately or strongly supported
changes in "current sentencing rules to increase the discretion of the
judge" (Federal Judicial Center 1994). Although the 1996 Federal Ju-
dicial Center survey did not ask what respondents thought about man-
datory penalties, 78.7 percent of district court judges "strongly" or
" The tension between local prosecutors wanting to do justice in individual cases and
political officials in the Department of Justice in Washington wanting to enforce stan-
dardized policies continues (e.g., Stith 2008).6 A U.S. General Accounting Office study covering 1999-2001 found that, even among
cases in which mandatory minimums were not circumvented by prosecutors, judges sen-
tenced below the minimum in 52 percent of cases (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003,
p. 14).
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"somewhat agreed" that their influence on the federal guidelines
should be reduced (Johnson and Gilbert 1997, table 10).
B. Oregon's Measure 11
Oregon's Measure 11, adopted by voters in a referendum in 1994,
required imposition of mandatory minimum prison sentences from 70
to 300 months on anyone (including children as young as 15) convicted
of any of 16 designated crimes. The law's coverage was later extended
to five additional crimes. A person who knew nothing about how courts
operate might expect that anyone who committed those 21 crimes
would receive the mandated sentences.
RAND Corporation evaluators understood how courts operate (Mer-
ritt, Fain, and Turner 2006). They supposed that judges and lawyers
would alter previous ways of doing business, especially in filing charges
and negotiating plea bargains, to achieve results that seemed to them
sensible and just. To find out whether they were right, they interviewed
a considerable number of practitioners, analyzed data on sentences for
offenses subject to Measure 11 and lesser related offenses for periods
before and after Measure 11 took effect, and conducted another round
of interviews to test their readings of the statistical analyses.
On the basis of the research summarized in Section II, they expected
that, compared with sentencing patterns before Measure 11, relatively
fewer people would be convicted of Measure 11 offenses and more of
non-Measure 11 offenses, those convicted of Measure 11 offenses
would receive harsher sentences, and jury trial rates would rise for a
while and then return to prior levels. The rationales were that prac-
titioners would divert some cases that would once have been Measure
11 offenses into less serious offense categories, that the remaining
Measure 11 cases would be of greater average seriousness than before
the law changed, and that the threat of harsher sentences would for a
while cause more defendants to take their chances on a trial rather
than plead guilty (but new going rates would in due course be estab-
lished and guilty plea rates would return to normal).
The research confirmed the hypotheses and in addition showed that
sentences for non-Measure 11 offenses also became harsher, that the
mandatory minimums increased prosecutors' power, and that the
changed sentencing patterns resulted primarily from changes in charg-
ing (fewer Measure 11 crimes, more lesser crimes) and plea bargaining
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(fewer pleas to initially charged offenses, more to lesser included of-
fenses).
The only other major related evaluation was carried out in New
Jersey by Candace McCoy and Patrick McManimon (2004), who ex-
amined sentencing patterns and case processing in New Jersey after
enactment of a "truth-in-sentencing" law requiring people convicted
of designated offenses to serve 85 percent of the announced sentence.
This was not a mandatory minimum sentence law, but similar hypoth-
eses apply: that power would be shifted to prosecutors, that charging
and bargaining patterns would change to shelter some defendants from
the new law, that sentences would be harsher for those not sheltered,
and that new plea negotiation "going rates" would be established. Each
of the hypotheses was substantiated.
Nothing found in any of these studies contradicts findings from ear-
lier periods.
IV. Mandatory Penalties in Other Countries
No Western country besides the United States has adopted a large
number of broad-based mandatory penalties. The small literature con-
cerns Australia, Canada, England and Wales, and South Africa. No
ambitious evaluations comparable to those discussed in Sections I-I1
have been undertaken. There have been efforts, however, to take stock
of their effects. The most recent and comprehensive is a report by the
Sentencing Advisory Council of the Australian State of Victoria. Its
conclusions are in line with every other major analysis: "Ultimately,
current research in this area indicates that there is a very low likelihood
that a mandatory sentencing regime will deliver on its [deterrent] aims.
• . . There is, in any case, ample evidence that mandatory sentencing
can and will be circumvented by lawyers, judges, and juries both by
accepted measures (such as plea bargaining) and by less visible means.
The outcome of this avoidance is to jeopardize seriously another aim
of mandatory sentencing; that is, to ensure that proportionate and con-
sistent sentences are imposed" (Sentencing Advisory Council 2008, p.
21).
A. England and Wales
By American standards, some other countries' mandatory penalty
laws are not mandatory at all. Three mandatory sentence laws were
The Effects of Mandatory Penalties
enacted in England and Wales as part of the Crime (Sentences) Act
1997. The first provided for an automatic life sentence (though affected
offenders remained eligible for parole release) for a second serious vi-
olent or sexual offense unless there were "exceptional" circumstances.
The other two specified a minimum 7-year sentence for third-time
trafficking in class A drugs and a minimum 3-year sentence for third-
time domestic burglary. These laws, however, provided that judges
could impose a lesser sentence if they concluded that imposition of the
mandatory sentence would be unjust "in all the circumstances." An-
drew Ashworth (2001), the preeminent British sentencing scholar, has
argued that that provision emasculated the law. The Court of Appeal,
in an opinion by Lord Chief Justice Wolfe, in a case involving man-
datory life sentences for second serious violent or sexual crimes, ruled
that a finding that the offender "was not felt to present a significant
risk to the public" would satisfy the "exceptional circumstances" test
(Jones and Newburn 2006, p. 787). Cavadino and Dignan observed
that the decision would "presumably allow sentencers to avoid passing
life sentences in many-perhaps most-of these 'two-strikes' cases
(2002, p. 106). The mandatory life sentence for a second violent or
sexual offense was repealed as part of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.17
B. South Africa
The South African laws were enacted in 1997 at a time of rapidly
rising crime rates, with a 2-year sunset clause and ostensibly as an
interim measure. They provided for mandatory minimums for certain
serious offenses and minimum 10-, 20-, and 30-year sentences for first,
second, and third rapes, respectively, and for specific types of murder.
Similar to the English law, the initial proposed law provided that courts
could impose less severe sentences if there were "circumstances" that
would justify them. Before the departure criterion was enacted, it was
redefined to require a finding of "substantial and compelling circum-
stances."' 8 The mandatory penalties remained in effect in mid-2009
after a series of 2-year extensions.
Constitutional challenges were raised. In S. v. Malgas, 2 SA 1222
(2001), the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, not unlike the
" The story of the enactment and experience with the English laws is told most fully by
Jones and Newburn (2006). Convictions for murder trigger an automatic (but parolable) life
sentence.
8 Van zyl Smit (2000) tells the tale in considerable detail.
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English Court of Appeal before it, broadened the departure test: "'Sub-
stantial and compelling circumstances' may arise from a number of
factors considered together-taken one by one, these factors need not
be exceptional. If the sentencing court considers all the circumstances
and is satisfied that the prescribed sentence would be unjust, as it would
be 'disproportionate to the crime, the criminal, and the needs of so-
ciety,' the court may impose a shorter sentence" (pp. 1234-35).
In the aftermath of Malgas, South Africa is repeating an old Amer-
ican story. Stephan Terblanche (2003) has argued that minimum sen-
tence legislation has worsened disparities and inconsistencies in South
African sentencing. Evaluations have shown that judges depart from
the mandatory minimums in a majority of cases (O'Donovan and Red-
path 2006). There is evidence that circumvention of the law is wide-
spread (Roth 2008, pp. 169-70) and that sentences for those not ben-
efitting from departures became harsher after the 1997 law was enacted
(Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers 2005).
The most comprehensive examination of the effects of South Africa's
mandatory penalties concluded that, because of Malgas, the laws did
not substantially increase constraints on judicial discretion. The study
documented increased inconsistency in sentencing and increases in
court costs and delays (O'Donovan and Redpath 2006, pp. 81-84).
C. Australia
Three-strikes laws in Western Australia and the Northern Territory
attracted considerable attention in Australia even though, by American,
English, and South African standards, they were mild (Hogg 1999; Law
Council of Australia 2001). The Northern Territory, which traditionally
has much the highest imprisonment rates in Australia, enacted a man-
datory penalty law in 1997 for a broad range of low-level offenses, in-
cluding theft, receiving stolen property, criminal damage, and unlawful
use of a vehicle. First-time adult offenders faced a mandatory minimum
14-day prison sentence, second-timers a minimum 90 days, and third-
timers a minimum of a year. A 28-day detention term was mandated for
15- and 16-year-olds convicted of a second or subsequent offense. In
1999, sexual and violent offenses were made subject to mandatory pen-
alties. As in the English and South African laws, an "exceptional circum-
stances" provision in all these laws allowed judges to avoid imposing the
minimum sentences on adults when they made appropriate findings
(Brown 2001). Johnson and Zdenkowski (2000), in an assessment of the
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effects, concluded that discretion had been shifted from judges to pros-
ecutors and that more case dispositions moved out of the spotlight and
into the shadows as defense lawyers negotiated charge dismissals and
agreements to permit informal dispositions (e.g., restitution). The man-
datories for property offenses were repealed in 2001. The mandatories
for violent and sexual offenses remained in effect in 2007 (Warner 2007).
Western Australia had two such laws. The first, enacted in 1992, was
precipitated by a rash of automobile thefts by juveniles that produced
police chases and 16 related traffic deaths in 18 months. It mandated
indeterminate (parolable) detention in addition to at least 18 months'
imprisonment. Only two juveniles were sentenced to indeterminate de-
tention under the law. An evaluation by the Western Australian Crime
Research Centre concluded that the law's enactment had no effect on
rates of automobile theft (Broadhurst and Loh 1993). The law was
repealed in 1994 (Brown 2001; Warner 2007).
A 1996 three-strikes law subjected people convicted for the third and
subsequent times of household burglary to a 12-month minimum sen-
tence to confinement. An Australian judge observed that such adult of-
fenders already typically received 18- to 36-month sentences, making
the mandatory penalty "less than the term of an imprisonment that an
adult might have expected before the law was changed" and therefore
largely symbolic (Yeats 1997, p. 375). The burglary three-strikes law
remained in effect in 2007. Kate Warner observed: "The heat seems to
have gone out of the debate, perhaps because in practice it has little
effect on adults and the courts have circumvented mandatory detention
for juveniles by imposing Conditional Release Orders" (2007, p. 337).
Neil Morgan's evaluation concluded that "there is compelling evi-
dence from WA that neither the 1992 nor the 1996 laws achieved a
deterrent effect. . . . There was a leap in residential burglaries im-
mediately after the introduction of the new [1996] laws at precisely
the time when the greatest reduction would have been expected"
(2000, p. 172).
D. Canada
Canada is a federal country in which the criminal code and its sen-
tencing laws are federal but prosecutions are handled in provincial
courts. There have been three major sets of mandatory penalties. 9 A
'9 Crutcher (2001) provides a detailed account of the history of mandatory penalties in
Canada.
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minimum sentence of 7 years was mandated for importation of nar-
cotics, but this was declared unconstitutional by the Canadian Supreme
Court because it was "grossly disproportionate to what the offender
deserves" (R v. Smith, 34 C.C.C. 3d 97 [1987], at p. 139). New man-
datories for drug importation were not enacted. A 1996 law mandated
minimum 4-year prison sentences for offenders committing any of 10
violent crimes with a firearm. Cheryl Webster and Anthony Doob,
after analyzing data on Canadian prison populations, concluded:
"While the mandatory minimum sentences for violent crimes did in
fact increase the sentences that some offenders received, it is likely that
the 'new' sanction would not significantly differ from one that would
have been handed down under the prior legislation for most offenders.
. . . It is probable they would already have been dealt with in a harsh
manner by Canadian judges" (2007, p. 317; emphasis in original). Leg-
islation introduced in 2006 (Bill C-10, 39th Parliament, 1st session)
requires a 5-year mandatory minimum for gang-related gun crimes or
gun use in relation to designated serious crimes and a longer minimum
for second convictions. It applies only to handguns and involves only
marginally more severe punishments than the 1996 legislation. It took
effect a few months before the time of writing. Doob and Webster
(2009) describe it, like its 1996 predecessor, as a primarily symbolic
tough-on-crime initiative of a conservative government.
None of the laws in Canada, England, South Africa, and Australia are
as severe as the harsher American laws and few are as rigid. To a con-
siderable extent these countries have recognized the foreseeable nullifi-
cation problems that face all rigid or severe sentencing laws by creating
"exceptional circumstance" authority for judges to depart openly and
accountably. The South Africans, however, have replicated the pattern
of stark and unjust disparities that result when some like-situated of-
fenders benefit from low-visibility circumvention of severe laws and oth-
ers go to prison for many years.
V Deterrent Effects
One claim often made for mandatory minimum sentence laws is that
their enactment and enforcement deter would-be offenders and thereby
reduce crime rates and spare victims' suffering. This claim, if true, makes
a powerful case. Unfortunately, the accumulated evidence shows that it
is not true.
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There are three kinds of sources of relevant evidence. First, govern-
ments in many countries have asked advisory committees or national
commissions to survey knowledge of the deterrent effects of criminal
penalties in general. Second, a sizable number of comprehensive re-
views of the literature on deterrence have been published. Third, eval-
uations have been conducted of the deterrent effects of newly enacted
mandatory penalty laws.
A. National Advisory Bodies
No one doubts that society is safer having some criminal penalties
rather than none at all, but that choice is not in issue. On the real-
world question of whether increases in penalties significantly reduce
the incidence of serious crimes, the consensus conclusion of govern-
mental advisory bodies in many countries is possibly, a little, at most,
but probably not.
After the most exhaustive examination of the question ever under-
taken, the National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on De-
terrent and Incapacitative Effects concluded: "In summary. . .we can-
not yet assert that the evidence warrants an affirmative conclusion
regarding deterrence" (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978, p. 7). Dan-
iel Nagin of Carnegie Mellon University, a principal draftsman of the
report, was less qualified in his assessment: "The evidence is woefully
inadequate for providing a good estimate of the magnitude of whatever
effect may exist. . . . Policymakers in the criminal justice system are
done a disservice if they are left with the impression that the empirical
evidence . . . strongly supports the deterrence hypothesis" (1978, pp.
135-36).
The National Academy of Sciences Panel on Understanding and
Controlling Violence reached a similar conclusion in 1993. After doc-
umenting that the average prison sentence per violent crime tripled
between 1975 and 1989, the panel asked, "What effect has increasing
the prison population had on violent crime?" and answered, "Appar-
ently very little" (Reiss and Roth 1993, p. 6). That answer took account
of both deterrent and incapacitative effects.
Similar bodies in other Western countries have reached similar con-
clusions. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's government cre-
ated a Home Office advisory committee on criminal penalties. The
resulting white paper, which led to an overhaul of English sentencing
laws in 1991, expressed skepticism about the deterrent effects of pen-
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alties: "Deterrence is a principle with much immediate appeal. . . . But
much crime is committed on impulse, given the opportunity presented
by an open window or unlocked door, and it is committed by offenders
who live from moment to moment; their crimes are as impulsive as
the rest of their feckless, sad, or pathetic lives. It is unrealistic to con-
struct sentencing arrangements on the assumption that most offenders
will weigh up the possibilities in advance and base their conduct on
rational calculation" (Home Office 1990, p. 6).
The same conclusions were earlier reached by the Canadian Sentenc-
ing Commission: "Evidence does not support the notion that variations
in sanctions (within a range that reasonably could be contemplated) af-
fect the deterrent value of sentences. In other words, deterrence cannot
be used with empirical justification, to guide the imposition of sentences"
(1987, p. xxvii). The Committee on Justice of the Canadian Parliament,
chaired by a member of the then-governing Conservative Party, a few
years later observed: "If locking up those who violate the law contributed
to safer societies, then the United States should be the safest country in
the world. In fact, the United States affords a glaring example of the
limited impact that criminal justice responses have on crime.. . . [The]
evidence from the US is that costly repressive measures alone fail to
deter crime. The Committee unanimously agrees that crime prevention
is the best policy choice" (Canada 1993, p. 2).
Negative findings concerning the deterrent effects of penalties are
not unique to English-speaking countries. The Finnish government
made a conscious policy decision in the mid-1970s to reduce the prison
population from what was widely seen as unacceptably high levels, and
it succeeded. The incarceration rate per 100,000 population fell by 60
percent between 1970 and 1992. The policy decision was based in large
part on an examination of evidence on deterrence. A report issued by
the Finnish Ministry of Justice's National Research Institute of Legal
Policy explained: "Can our long prison sentences be defended on the
basis of a cost/benefit assessment of their general preventative effect?
The answer of the criminological expertise was no" (T6rnudd 1993).
Alfred Blumstein, chairman of the National Academy of Sciences
panels on deterrence and incapacitation (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin
1978), sentencing research (Blumstein et al. 1983), and criminal careers
(Blumstein et al. 1986) and long America's leading authority on crime-
control research, explained why, on empirical grounds, three-strikes
laws (and by implication all mandatory penalties) are misconceived:
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"However hard it is for rational folks to conceive of it, there are some
people who simply do not respond to whatever threat is presented to
them. The problem is that any serious three-strikes candidate probably
falls into that category. For people who see no attractive options in the
legitimate economy, and who are doubtful that they will live another
ten years in any event, the threat of an extended prison stay is likely
to be far less threatening than it would be to a well-employed person
with a family" (Blumstein 1994, p. 415).
The government committees and commissions agree that insufficient
evidence exists for basing detailed sanctioning policies on the deter-
rence hypothesis. The American National Academy of Sciences panel
reports concur.
B. Surveys of the Literature
The critical question is whether marginal changes in sanctions have
measurable deterrent effects. The heavy majority of broad-based re-
views reach similar conclusions that no credible evidence demonstrates
that increasing penalties reliably achieves marginal deterrent effects. A
few reviews by economists, relying solely on work by economists, come
out the other way. They have been convincingly refuted. The surveys
by noneconomists discuss social science work generally, including that
of economists.
Philip Cook, one of a handful of senior economists who have spe-
cialized on crime topics, surveyed the literature in 1980. He concluded
that existing studies showed that "there exist feasible actions on the
part of the criminal justice system that may be effective in deterring
[certain] crimes . . . [but the studies] do not demonstrate that all types
of crimes are potentially deterrable, and certainly they provide little
help in predicting the effects of any specific governmental action"
(1980, p. 215; emphasis in original).
Daniel Nagin, in 1998, revisiting the work of the 1978 National
Academy of Sciences panel 20 years later, observed that he "was con-
vinced that a number of studies have credibly demonstrated marginal
deterrent effects," but he concluded that it was "difficult to generalize
from the findings of a specific study because knowledge about the fac-
tors that affect the efficacy of policy is so limited" (1998, p. 4). He
highlighted four major factors: the relation between short- and long-
term effects, the relation between risk perceptions and sanctions pol-
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icies, the methods of implementation, and the extent of implementa-
tion.
Andrew von Hirsch and his colleagues (1999), in a survey of the
literature commissioned by the Home Office of England and Wales,
concluded that "there is as yet no firm evidence regarding the extent
to which raising the severity of punishment would enhance deter-
rence of crime" (p. 52). Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster, in 2003,
in yet another major review of the literature, noted some inconclusive
or weak evidence of marginal deterrence, but they concluded: "There
is no plausible body of evidence that supports policies based on this
premise [that increased penalties reduce crime]. On the contrary,
standard social scientific norms governing the acceptance of the null
hypothesis justify the present (always rebuttable) conclusion that sen-
tence severity does not affect levels of crime" (2003, p. 146).20 A
meta-analysis by Travis Pratt and his colleagues (2006) produced a
main finding on deterrence, one "noted by previous narrative reviews
of the deterrence literature," that "the effects of severity estimates
and deterrence/sanctions composites, even when statistically signifi-
cant, are too weak to be of substantive significance (consistently be-
low -. 1)" (p. 379).
Three literature surveys by economists, summarizing work princi-
pally by themselves and other economists, conclude that increases in
punishment achieve marginal deterrent effects. The insularity of work
by economists creates a serious problem: although other social scien-
tists regularly explain data problems and unwarranted assumptions that
bedevil many economic analyses of punishment, economists seldom
acknowledge the criticisms, the problems, or the existence of deter-
rence research by noneconomists.2" Donald Lewis describes "a sub-
stantial body of evidence which is largely consistent with the existence
of a deterrent effect from longer sentences" (1986, p. 60). Steve Levitt,
relying principally on data from two of his own analyses, describes
them as evidence "for a deterrent effect of increases in expected pun-
ishment" (2002, p. 445). Levitt and George Miles (2007) conclude:
201 reached the same conclusion in a 2008 Crime and Justice essay (-onry 2008).
2 In a classic instance, Joanna Shepherd, e.g., author of several economic studies finding a
deterrent effect of capital punishment, in 2004 testified before the U.S. Congress that there
was a "strong consensus among economists that capital punishment deters crime" and that
"the studies are unanimous" (2004, pp. 10-11), without mentioning the equally strong consensus
among noneconomists (with agreement of many economists [Donohue and Wolfers 2005;
Donohue 2006] that capital punishment cannot be shown to deter homicide).
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"The new empirical evidence [produced exclusively by economists]
generally supports the deterrence model. . . . Evidence of the crime-
reducing effects of the scale of policing and incarceration is consistent
across different methodological approaches" (p. 456). Much of their
discussion focuses on whether capital punishment, recent increases in
the scale of imprisonment, and changes in use of police manpower have
reduced crime rates; the marginal deterrence hypothesis receives little
attention except concerning a study by Kessler and Levitt (1999) of
the effects of a change in California law.22
C. Evaluations and Impact Assessments
Two literatures are germane. Evaluations of mandatory minimum laws
in the 1970s and 1980s focused on effects on sentencing outcomes and
court processes. These generally conclude that deterrent effects cannot
be shown to be associated with passage and implementation of manda-
tory penalty laws. A second literature, all focused on California in the
1990s, examines the effects on crime rates of changes in California sen-
tencing laws. Most of it concerns the three-strikes law. None of the
major California studies focused primarily on implementation and case
processing or was as ambitious as the federal mandatory minimum study
or the New York drug law evaluation. The divide in California between
some economists and other social scientists is stunning. Work by non-
economists and some economists concludes that no crime-preventive
effects can be shown. Work by other economists concludes that the
new laws have had substantial deterrent effects.
1. Mandatory Minimum Evaluations. No individual evaluation has
demonstrated crime reduction effects attributable to enactment or im-
plementation of a mandatory minimum sentence law. One analysis
combined data from four studies that had not found deterrent effects
and concluded that a small deterrent effect could be shown. For rea-
sons given below, the finding is not credible.
The evaluators of the Rockefeller Drug Laws expended most of their
efforts trying to identify effects on drug use or drug-related crime.
They found none (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evalu-
ation 1978).
22 Kessler and Levitt (1999) sought to identify deterrent effects from passage in 1982 of a
California referendum that increased penalties for certain crimes. They examined crime data
at 2-year intervals and thereby missed a downward trend that began in 1980 and continued
after passage of the referendum. This made the post-1982 decline as likely to be the extension
of a preexisting trend as a deterrent effect (Webster, Doob, and Zimring 2006).
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A number of studies were made of the crime-preventive effects of the
Massachusetts law requiring a 1-year minimum sentence for people con-
victed of possession of an unregistered firearm. The studies concluded
that it had either no deterrent effect on the use of firearms in violent
crimes (Beha 1977; Rossman et al. 1979; Carlson 1982) or a small short-
term effect that quickly disappeared (Pierce and Bowers 1981).
Studies in other states reached similar results. An evaluation of the
mandatory sentencing law for firearms offenses in Detroit, Michigan,
concluded that "the mandatory sentencing law did not have a preventive
effect on crime" (Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall 1983). Assessments
of the deterrent effects of mandatory penalty laws in Tampa, Jacksonville,
and Miami, Florida, "concluded that the results did not support a pre-
ventive effect model" (Loftin and McDowall 1984, p. 259). The results
of evaluations of the crime-preventive effects of mandatory penalty laws
in operation in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, "do not
strongly challenge the conclusion that the statutes have no preventive
effect" (McDowall, Loftin, and Wersema 1992, p. 382).
One analysis based on evaluation data concluded that mandatory
penalties had deterrent effects. McDowall, Loftin, and Wersema
(1992), the team of researchers who conducted the Michigan, Florida,
and Pennsylvania deterrence analyses mentioned in the preceding par-
agraph, combined the data from all six sites in three states and con-
cluded that mandatory penalties for gun crimes reduced gun homicides
but not assaults or robberies involving guns. This is counterintuitive.
Homicides by definition are lethal assaults, and the ratios of assaults
and robberies that involve guns and result in deaths should be relatively
stable, assuming there have been no substantial changes in the lethality
of available weapons. If the proportions of assaults and robberies in-
volving guns decline, gun homicides should decline commensurately,
and vice versa. If a deterrent effect can be shown for relatively small
numbers of homicides, it should be much easier to demonstrate for
vastly larger numbers of assaults and robberies.
2. California Studies. The gap between politics and knowledge con-
cerning the effects of California's three-strikes law has been enormous.
Most credible empirical assessments of the law's effects on crime rates
and patterns have concluded that none can be shown. From the law's
initial passage in 1994 during the administration of Republican Gov-
ernor Pete Wilson, California politicians have claimed to believe its
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passage and implementation were major causes of California's substan-
tial crime-rate decline during the 1990s.
a. California Government Views. Although it took a dozen years,
some agencies of California government eventually expressed views
consistent with those of (most) researchers. It was a long time coming.
In 1999, California Secretary of State Bill Jones claimed: "After five
years, we now have strong statistical data to show the law is working
as intended. California's murder and robbery rates are down by 50%
[and] the overall crime rate in California has declined 38%. . . . It is
clear that the implementation of the Three Strikes and You're Out
Law has made a considerable positive impact on the incidence of crime
and California" (Secretary of State 1999, pp. 1, 3).
Governor Wilson, in vetoing legislation creating a commission to
study the law's effects, said its aim was to "disprove the obvious positive
impact of the Three Strikes law. . . .There are many mysteries in life,
but the efficiency of 'Three Strikes' . . . is not one of them" (quoted
in California District Attorneys Association 2004, p. 32). Wilson's suc-
cessor, Democrat Grey Davis, vetoing a similar bill calling for a study
commission, observed that "the savings associated with the law, in
terms of lives not destroyed, injuries not sustained, and property not
stolen . . . is ultimately incalculable, but very serious" (quoted in Cal-
ifornia District Attorneys Association 2004, p. 32).
By 2004, when the accumulation of studies suggesting otherwise had
become huge, even the California District Attorneys Association ex-
pressed more cautious views: the "dramatic drop in California's crime
rate might be properly attributable to several substantial factors. It is
counter-intuitive, however, to think that incarcerating violent recidivist
felons for longer periods (whether under the two- or three-strikes pro-
visions of this law) was not one of them" (2004, p. 21).
In 2005, the Legislative Analyst's Office, after presenting an analysis
showing that the declines in overall and violent crime rates in the four
counties in which the law was most often applied and the four in which
it was least often applied were indistinguishable, concluded: "For now,
it remains an open question as to how much safer California's citizens
are as a result of Three Strikes" (p. 33).
b. California Impact Assessments. Many three-strikes laws are not,
strictly speaking, mandatory minimum sentence laws. Under Califor-
nia's, for example, both prosecutors and judges can "strike" the prior
convictions that trigger the law's mandatory minimum sentences; if
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TABLE 3
California Three Strikes: Effects on Reduced Crime Rates
Authors
Schiraldi and Ambrosio
(1997)
Stolzenberg and
D'Alessio (1997)
Males and Macallair
(1999)
Chen (2000, 2008)
Austin et al. (2000)
Caulkins (2001)
Marvell and Moody
(2001)
Moody, Marvell, and
Kaminski (2003)
Zimring et al. (2001)
Shepherd (2002)
Ehlers et al. (2004)
Kovandzic et al. (2004)
Justice Policy Institute
(2004)
Tonry (2004)
Legislative Analyst's
Office, California
(2005)
Deterrent
Method Effect
Yes/no three-strike state comparisons None
Time series: 10 largest California
cities
California age group comparisons
California county comparisons
Time series: 50 states
Time series: California
California county comparisons
Yes/no three-strike state comparisons
National econometric model
Time series: 50 states
Time series: 50 states
California county comparisons
California age group comparisons
California econometric model
California county comparisons
Yes/no three-strike state comparisons
Model: U.S. cities
Yes/no three-strike state comparisons
Time series: 10 most populous states
California county comparisons
None
None
None
None
Not significant
None
None
None
None: increased
murder rates
None: increased
murder rates
None
None
Yes
None
None
None: increased
murder rates
None
None
None
they do so, the law and its penalties do not apply. I discuss the literature
briefly. It is well known and with only rare exceptions reaches the same
conclusion-that the law's passage and implementation had no de-
monstrable effects on crime rates (or, perversely, increased homicide
rates).
Table 3 summarizes the findings of 15 empirical efforts to assess the
crime-preventive effects of California's three-strikes law. They involve
four principal research designs: econometric time-series designs (e.g.,
Chen 2000, 2008; Caulkins 2001; Marvell and Moody 2001; Shepherd
2002); noneconometric time-series comparisons of California crime-
rate trends with those of other states (e.g., Schiraldi and Ambrosio
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1997; Austin et al. 2000; Ehlers et al. 2004; Tonry 2004); time-series
comparisons within California of crime-rate trends in counties in
which three-strikes charges were filed often and seldom (e.g., Males
and Macallair 1999; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001; Ehlers et al.
2004; Legislative Analyst's Office 2005); and comparisons within Cal-
ifornia of crime-rate trends for people of different ages (e.g., Males
and Macallair 1999; Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001).
Only two of the studies shown in table 3 conclude that the three-
strikes law reduced California crime rates (Chen 2000; Shepherd 2002).
Three studies (Marvell and Moody 2001; Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vi-
eraitis 2002; Moody, Marvell, and Kaminski 2003) concluded that en-
actment of three-strikes laws produced increases in homicide rates.
Chen's findings were weak, and her conclusions were hedged.23 Joanna
Shepherd (2002) produced the only assessment finding significant ef-
fects: "During the first two years after the legislation's enactment, ap-
proximately eight murders, 3,952 aggravated assaults, 10,672 robberies,
and 384,488 burglaries were deterred in California by the two- and
three-strikes legislation" (p. 174).
Shepherd's findings on this subject correspond to findings of herself
and other economists on the deterrent effects of capital punishment
(e.g., Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd 2003) and enactment of "shall
issue" laws that authorize private citizens to carry concealed firearms
in public (e.g., Lott and Mustard 1997; Lott [1998] 2000). In all three
cases, the economic analyses reach conclusions about strong deterrent
effects that are different from almost all studies by noneconomists. In
the latter two cases, other economists have demonstrated why the find-
ings are not credible (capital punishment: e.g., Donohue and Wolfers
2005; Donohue 2006; concealed weapons: Ayres and Donohue 2003a,
2003b). Problems recurringly identified are the reliance solely on of-
ficial data analyzed at county or state levels, lack of awareness of case
processing differences at local levels, and poorly specified models. It is
common for other economists, when reanalyzing data in published
works, to show that minor changes in assumptions in economic models
produce enormous changes in results (often changing the sign; e.g.,
showing that the change appears to have increased rather than de-
23 "The approach taken in California has not been dramatically more effective at controlling
crime than other states' efforts.. . . [California's law] is not considerably more effective at
crime reduction than alternative methods that are narrower in scope" (Chen 2008, pp. 362,
365). Doob and Webster (2003) have demonstrated fumdamental problems with her analysis.
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creased crimes rates). The fundamental problem, however, is that econ-
omists assume what other social scientists investigate-that increased
penalties reduce crime rates. Shepherd, for example, observes that her
"model predicts that offenses covered by two- and three-strikes legis-
lation will be deterred" (2002, p. 173). That economists' models are
often devised to confirm their assumptions ("predictions") may be why
they so often do and why others can pick the models apart. In the case
of California's three-strikes law, however, Shepherd is an outlier; other
economists' analyses concur with the no-deterrent-effect conclusions
of noneconomists (Marvell and Moody 2001; Kovandzic, Sloan, and
Vieraitis 2002; Moody, Marvell, and Kaminski 2003).
No matter which body of evidence is consulted-the general liter-
ature on the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions, work more nar-
rowly focused on the marginal deterrence hypothesis, or the evaluation
literature on mandatory penalties-the conclusion is the same. There
is little basis for believing that mandatory penalties have any significant
effects on rates of serious crime.
VI. Undoing the Harm
The policy and human rights implications of this two-century-old body
of knowledge are clear. Mandatory penalties are a bad idea. They often
result in injustice to individual offenders. They undermine the legiti-
macy of the courts and the prosecution system by fostering circum-
ventions that are willful and subterranean. They undermine achieve-
ment of equality before the law when they cause comparably culpable
offenders to be treated radically differently when one benefits from
practitioners' circumventions and another receives a mandated penalty
that everyone immediately involved considers too severe. And the clear
weight of the evidence is, and for nearly 40 years has been, that there
is insufficient credible evidence to conclude that mandatory penalties
have significant deterrent effects.
Supporters of mandatory penalties in anxious times are concerned
with political and symbolic goals. Put positively, elected officials want
to reassure the public generally that their fears have been noted and
that the causes of their fears have been acted on. Officials who support
mandatory penalties often do not much care about problems of imple-
mentation, foreseeable patterns of circumvention, or the certainty of
excessively and unjustly severe penalties for some offenders. Their in-
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terests are different. Put negatively, officials want to curry public favor
and electoral support by pandering, by making promises that the law
can at best imperfectly and incompletely deliver.
The most famous and most far-reaching mandatory sentencing law,
California's three-strikes law, resulted from politicians' competing at-
tempts to use punishment policies to pursue purely political goals. It
was enacted not because thoughtful policy makers really believed that
people who stole pizza slices in schoolyards or handfuls of compact
discs from Wal-Mart deserved decades-long prison sentences but be-
cause Republican Governor Pete Wilson and California Assembly
Leader Willie Brown played a game of chicken from which, in the end,
neither backed down. Democratic legislators agreed among themselves
to pass any proposal Governor Wilson offered, in hopes "that he would
back down from an unqualified 'get tough' stand or be politically neu-
tralized if he persisted." Wilson did not blink. Nor did the Democrats.
The law was passed as proposed because both sides were "unwilling to
concede the ground on 'getting tough' to the other side in the political
campaign to come." As a result California adopted the most far-reach-
ing and rigid three-strikes law in the country (Zimring, Hawkins, and
Kamin 2001, p. 6).
However their motives are portrayed, for many legislators, their pri-
mary purpose has been achieved when their vote is cast. They have been
seen to be tough on crime. Calls for enactment of mandatory penalties,
or introductions of bills, or castings of votes are symbolic statements.
Instrumental arguments about effectiveness or normative arguments
about injustice to offenders fall on deaf ears.
The dilemma is that the public officials who enact mandatory sen-
tencing laws support them for symbolic and political reasons while the
public officials who administer mandatory sentencing laws oppose them
for instrumental and normative reasons. The instrumental arguments
against mandatory penalties are clear. First, they increase public expense
by increasing trial rates and case processing times. Second, in every pub-
lished evaluation, judges and prosecutors were shown to have devised
ways to circumvent application of the mandatory penalties.
The normative arguments against mandatory penalties are also
straightforward. First, simple justice: because of their inflexibility, such
laws sometimes result in imposition of penalties in individual cases that
everyone involved believes to be unjustly severe. Second, perhaps more
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importantly, mandatory penalties encourage hypocrisy on the part of
prosecutors and judges.
The hypocrisies that mandatory penalties engender are what most
troubles prosecutors and judges. Plea bargaining may be a necessary
evil, an essential lubricant without which the machinery of justice
would break down, but it is typically routinized. Armed robbery is pled
down to robbery, aggravated assault to assault, theft 1 to theft 2. Pros-
ecutors, defense counsel, judges, probation officers-all who are in-
volved-know what is happening, understand why, and acknowledge
the legitimacy of the reasons.
Legislators, whatever their purposes for supporting mandatory sen-
tencing laws, once the vote is cast, move on to other issues. For judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel, it is another story. They must live
with their own consciences and with their shared views of the bounds
of fair treatment of offenders. They must also keep the courts func-
tioning. That they sometimes devise ways to avoid application of laws
they believe to be undeservedly harsh should come as no surprise.
Ironically, most mandatory penalty provisions enacted during the
1980s and 1990s concerned drug crimes, behaviors that both practition-
ers and researchers believe to be uniquely insensitive to the deterrent
effects of sanctions. Despite risks of arrest, imprisonment, injury, and
death, drug trafficking offers economic and other rewards to disadvan-
taged people that appear to far outweigh any available in the legitimate
economy. Market niches created by the arrest of dealers are as a result
often filled within hours, as many studies of drug marketing by ethnog-
raphers have shown, (e.g., Johnson et al. 1990; Padilla 1992; Fagan
1993). As a result, according to Alfred Blumstein, there is no evidence
that harsh drug law enforcement policies have been at all successful: "Of
course, that result is not at all surprising. Anyone who is removed from
the street is likely to be replaced by someone drawn from the inevitable
queue of replacement dealers ready to join the industry. It may take some
time for recruitment and training but experience shows that replacement
is easy and rapid" (1994, p. 400).
Both police officials and conservative scholars agree. James Q. Wil-
son (1990, p. 534) has observed that "significant reductions in drug
abuse will come only from reducing demand for those drugs . . .the
marginal product of further investment in supply reduction [law en-
forcement] is likely to be small." He reports: "I know of no serious
law-enforcement official who disagrees with this conclusion. Typically,
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police officials tell interviewers that they are fighting a losing war or,
at best, a holding action" (p. 534). Similarly, U.S. Senator Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan of New York, a sometime supporter of the drug wars,
has acknowledged: "'Drug busts are probably necessary symbolic acts,
but nothing more" (1997, p. 208).
In a sensible world of rational policy making, no mandatory penalty
laws would be enacted. Those that exist would be repealed. That would
be the simplest way to address the problems revealed by the literature
and canvassed in this essay. That is not the world we live in. There
are other ways the problems could be addressed or at least diminished.
A. Make Mandatory Penalties Presumptive
Much of what legislators hope to accomplish with mandatory sen-
tencing laws could be achieved by making such laws presumptive. In a
few states-Minnesota is an example-judges are given authority to
disregard most mandatory penalties and impose some other sentence
if reasons are given. Prosecutors who wish to can appeal the adequacy
of the reasons given. Converting all mandatory penalties to presump-
tive penalties would sacrifice few of the values sought to be achieved
by such laws but would avoid many of the undesirable side effects.
Prosecutors and judges both have powerful voices in sentencing.
Disregard of the presumption would usually require that both agree
that the penalty would be too severe in a particular case or that the
political climate has altered and public sensibilities no longer demand
especially harsh penalties. The final word, however, should be the
judge's. Prosecutors too often are motivated by the notoriety of a case,
their personal ideology, or their political self-interest to insist on se-
verity when a more detached view would suggest otherwise.
By enacting a mandatory (presumptive) penalty law, the legislature
would be expressing its policy judgment that, say, people who commit
robberies with firearms deserve at least a 3-year minimum prison term.
Most prosecutors and judges would accept that such policy decisions
are the legislature's to make and that that one is not patently unrea-
sonable. The law's facial legitimacy would cause many prosecutors and
judges to deal with it in good faith. The law's presumptive character,
however, would let judges take account of mitigating circumstances
(the defendant was an underage, bullied, unarmed participant who re-
mained in the car) without resort to subterfuge.
If official circumvention of mandatory penalties in cases where they
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seem unduly harsh is foreseeable, and it is, conversion to mandatory
(presumptive) penalties is likely to result in no less systematic enforce-
ment but to lessen hypocritical efforts at avoidance.
B. Enact "Sunset" Clauses
Our understandings of the politics and empirical experience of man-
datory penalties could be married by including sunset clauses in all
future mandatory penalty laws and adding them to existing ones. Sun-
set clauses provide for automatic repeal of a statute at a fixed time
unless a new vote is taken to extend its life. This proposal, first made,
to my knowledge, by Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie Mellon University
at a "presidential crime summit" in 1991, would both acknowledge felt
political imperatives and limit the damage mandatory penalties do.
Any honest politician will concede two points-that it is often difficult
to resist political pressures to vote for tough penalties and that it is always
difficult to vote to make penalties more "lenient." Blumstein's proposal
addresses both propositions. If a charged political climate or campaign
or a series of notorious crimes makes it difficult to resist "tough-on-
crime" proposals, such laws will continue to be enacted. Statute books
are cluttered with provisions passed on the passions of moments. Often,
however, passions subside with time, and competing values and calmer
consideration make the wisdom of such laws less clear.
Sunset clauses would assure that laws passed in the passion of a mo-
ment do not endure for decades, long after many people think them
good policies-as the Rockefeller Drug Laws and the federal crack/pow-
der 100-to- 1 laws have done for more than 35 and 20 years, respectively.
Few people support either of those laws on the merits. Proposals to
repeal them have been being made for decades, but risk-averse elected
officials have been unwilling to vote for repeal. With sunset clauses in
place, legislators unwilling to take responsibility for voting for repeal of
a punitive law may feel able more comfortably acceding to its lapse.
C. Narrow Mandatory Penalties' Scope
If the bases for passing sentencing laws were concerns for justice and
institutional effectiveness, most mandatory penalties would be repealed
and few others would be enacted to take their places. That is unlikely.
Horrible, senseless crimes do occur, public fears and anxieties are
heightened, and elected officials want to respond. There being in prac-
tice little that officials can do about crime, the attractions of mandatory
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penalties as a rhetorical demonstration of concern are great. A New
York Times article about mandatory proposals offered by U.S. Senator
Alfonse D'Amato of New York, for example, reports: "Mr. D'Amato
conceded that his two successful amendments, which Justice Depart-
ment officials say would have little practical effect on prosecution of
crimes, might not solve the problem. 'But,' he said, 'it does bring about
a sense that we are serious"' (Ifill 1991, p. A6).
The most extreme versions of nullification and circumvention involve
laws that mandate severe penalties for minor crimes. In eighteenth-
century England, juries often refused to convict of capital offenses those
who were charged with property crimes. In Michigan in the fifties,
judges refused to impose mandatory minimum 20-year sentences for
drug sales. Modern federal prosecutors and judges often work to avoid
imposition of lengthy minimum sentences on minor offenders.
One way, therefore, to bring the symbolic goals of legislators and the
instrumental and normative concerns of criminal justice practitioners
into better balance would be to confine the scope of mandatory penalties
to patently serious crimes such as homicide and aggravated rape and to
maintain an empirically realistic balance between the gravity of crimes
and the severity of punishments.
D. Authorize Correctional Reconsideration of Lengthy Sentences
Little public harm would accrue, and considerable private benefit
obtain, if correctional or parole authorities were authorized periodi-
cally to reconsider lengthy sentences (say 5 or 10 years) and to release
prisoners. Increasing numbers of prisoners are now being held under
10-, 20-, and 30-year mandatory minimum terms or under sentences
of life without the possibility of parole. In many states, the steady
accumulation of such prisoners promises sizable long-term increases in
prison populations and budgets. Many such long-term prisoners con-
tinue to be held long after they present any threat to anyone and long
after any clamor for their continuing incarceration has subsided. Under
the laws of most states, such prisoners can be released only by pardon
or commutation. In our era, these powers are seldom exercised. Giving
correctional authorities power to reconsider the need or desirability of
long sentences would allow eventual release of people receiving un-
usually long sentences without requiring extraordinary political deci-
sions such as gubernatorial pardons or commutations.
The argument for administrative reconsideration of lengthy man-
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datory sentences parallels the argument for sunset clauses in mandatory
penalty statutes-some decisions present such difficult political prob-
lems for elected officials that it is better to eliminate the need to make
them. Almost despite the desirability of repealing a mandatory penalty
or releasing old and harmless people from prison, feelings of political
vulnerability prevent decisions that on their merits ought to be made.
Permitting corrections or parole officials to decide when a prisoner
under lengthy sentence has served long enough would remove those
decisions from the public eye.
Mandatory penalties is not a subject on which research has counted
for much in the United States for the past 30 years. Policy debates
neither waited for nor paid much attention to research results. We now
know what we are ever likely to know, and what our predecessors knew,
about mandatory penalties. They do little good and much harm. If New
York does repeal its Rockefeller Drug Laws and if that proves a harbinger
of change generally, the time may be coming when policy and knowledge
will point in the same direction. There will be little need for mandatory
penalties, and academics will have no need to propose "reforms" pre-
mised on the inability of elected officials to make sensible decisions. If
that does not happen, proposals such as those offered here provide
mechanisms for reconciling the perceived symbolic and rhetorical needs
of elected officials with the legal system's needs for integrity in process
and justice in punishment.
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